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TWO NOTES ON NASH AND INFORMATION
Aart J. de Zeeuw
~~d~The Brandsma-HUghes Hallett set of "Nash solutions" contains many
points, but not the Nash solution.
~)~~)
Aart J. de Zeeuw
Tilburq University
Abstract
Brandsma and Hughes Hallett (1982) claim that they calculate the op-
timal Nash solutions for two person nonzero sum linear quadratic dif-
ference games. This letter shows, by means of an example, that the
actions which result from their equilibrium concept do not have to
satisfy the Nash conditions. Furthermore it is pointed out, that the
introduced so called "time consistency constraints" do not add any-
thing to the solution of the problem.





"~) Thanks are due to Geert Jan Olsder, Max Merbis and Thijs ten Raa
for helpful comments.- 1 -
1. Introduction
Brandsma and Hughes Hallett (1982, p. 14) write: "The solutions proposed
elsewhere for dynamic non-cooperative games all appear to be suboptimal
because of the time inconsistency induced by using recursive optimi-
zations and the absence of time consistency constraints [...., Plasmans
and de Zeeuw (1980)]".
This statement is false.
The solution proposed in the paper, where the authors refer to, is op-
timal, but with respect to a different model than the one Brandsma and
Hughes Hallett have in mind. The solution is not derived by means of
dynamic programming (D.P., recursive optimizations), but by means of
Pontryagin's minimum principle. However, D.P. yields the same (unique)
solution for that model, which means, that Bellman's principle of opti-
mality (time consistency) holds. (In de Zeeuw (1980) f.e. it can be seen,
that this is not always true in the same type of models.)
A technique like D.P. cannot be "wrong" in itself, but can or cannot be
used to solve a problem. It can be used to solve the standard optimal
control problem or the stagewise difference game (see f.e. Ba~ar and
Olsder (1982)), but it cannot be used to solve the model proposed by
Brandsma and Hughes Hallett. Now one can argue, that dynamic models
should be stated such, that D.P. is applicable. I come back to this in
section 3. There it is also shown, that the constraints, which according
to Brandsma and Hughes Hallett should be introduced to make the problem
time consistent, can only be determined after the problem is solved.
Or, one cannot formulate an equivalent time consistent model without
knowing the solution. In that case, to my point of view, the reformula-
tion becomes useless.- 2 -
More important is though, that Brandsma and Hughes Hallett, in the true
spirit of Kydland and Prescott (1977), have reintroduced the "conjectural
variations", which go as far back as Bowley (1924, p. 38). In fact the
information structure of the qame is changed in the sense, that now the
information set of each player contains the actions of the other player.
Such an assumption is rather strange in this non-hierarchical or non-
sequential solution concept, where the players enter the game symme-
trically. A consequence of this information structure is also, that the
(nonunique) actions, which result from the proposed equilibrium concept,
do not have to satisfy the Nash conditions. Section 2 is built around a
simple example to make this clear.
2. "Conjectural variations" in open loop Nash?
In Plasmans and de Zeeuw (1980) the Nash solution is given for a feed-
back information structure. That is, the players know the present state
of the system. Here an open loop information structure is considered.
That is, the players have only access to the initial state of the system,
which is known à priori. This makes it possible to transform the dynamic
problem into a static one. Now the players have to select an action from
the action space. The action space is the Cartesian product of the sets
of possible decisions at each point in time. In this standard termino-
logy a strategy would be a mapping from the information space to the ac-
tion space. Brandsma and Hughes Hallett start off with strategies, where
the information space is the action space of the other player. They de-
fine a(Nash) equilibrium concept for these strategies. When the players
would only announce such strategies, the game cannot be played, because
the information, i.e. the action of the other player, is missing. So,- 3 -
finally the corresponding actions have to be calculated as the solution
of a linear set of equations. But these actions do not have to fit the
Nash conditions. That is, given the action of the other player, gene-
rally a player could improve himself and vice versa. So, introducing
information, which is not available, leads to solutions, which are not
Nash.
In what follows the standard open loop Nash or Cournot model is described
as well as the one with conjectural variations for the linear quadratic
strict convex case. A simple example is given and it is shown, that the
set of solutions for the model with conjectural variations does not even
contain the Nash solution for this example.
Open loop Nash:
- action space of player i: X(1), i- 1,2.
- strict convex quadratic cost functionals:
w(i). X(1) x X(2) -,g2}, i- 1,2.
- first order conditions (reaction functions):
x(1) - p(1)x(2) t d(1) x(2) F X(2)
x(2) - D(2)x(1) t d(2) x(1) E X(1)
(1)
(2)
- Nash or Cournot equilibrium:- 4 -
solution ( x(1)~,x(Z)~) E X(1) x X(2j to set of equations (1) and (2).
With conjectural variations:
- strategies:
- first order conditions:
i
f(1). X(2) ; X(1) with
af(1) - D(1)
ax(2) '




x(1) - D(1)(D(2))x(2) } d(1)(D(2)),
x(2) E X(2)
(3)














x(i).- ~2 i - 1,2.
(i) (1) (2) 1 T (i)T (i)
- w ((x ,x )):- 2(y y t x x ).
where y- x(1) t x(2) f c, c-[1 1]T, i- 1,2.
- first order conditions (reaction functions):
(
x(i) -- Z(x(2) f c), x(2) Egt2,
x(2)
-- 1(x(1) t c) , x(1) c Il22.
- 2 - - -
(1)~ (2)~ 1 1 T
- Nash solution: x - x '[- 3- 3] -
- with conjectural variations:
x(1) - D(1)~x(2) } d(1)' x(2) F~2,
x(2) - D(2)`x(1) } d(2)' x(1) E~2.
where d(1)~ - D(1)~c, i- 1,2,
D(1)~` - D(2)~T
- D~,
(D~)2 f 3D~ t Z- 0.
So, in the case with conjectural variations, even this simple symmetric
game has many solutions. It is not clear, whether there are and, if so,- 6 -
which are dominant solutions. Especially in applications this non-
uniqueness is a very unpleasant feature. As an example three solutions
are given:
3 f 1 ~ 0 ~ -2 1 ~ - 1 -11 . - 2 2
D- ( v D IJ ~ D - 3 1 I 1 -1, - 1 2 0 - z t 2~
with actions
x(1)' - x(2)' - ~- 2- 1jT x(1)~ - x(2)~
- ~- 1- Z~T and
- - 5 5 5 5
(1)~ (2)~ 1 1 1 1 T
x - x - ~- 2 } 10 ~' - 2} 10 ~~ ~ respectively.
All these three action pairs do not satisfy the Nash conditions. More-
over, the only point, that does, is not even an element of the complete
set of action pairs, which results from the equilibrium concept with
conjectural variations. This can be seen from the following lemma.
Lemma: the set of equations
1 1 ' ~ ~ "T
- 3 c-- 3 D c t d, D - D ,
d~ - D~C ,(D~)2 } 3D~ t I- 0
is inconsistent.-~-
3. "Time consistency constraints"?
The model proposed by Brandsma and Hughes Hallett does not satisfy
Bellman's principle of optimality (is time inconsistent). This means,
that after the game has been played a few time steps, the remaining
strategies do not form a solution to the rest of the game. The reason
is, that in the model present actions are a function of future actions
of the other player (non-causality or anticipativity). But, when one
looks at the problem dynamically, this functional relationship becomes
irrelevant as soon as the actions are actually carried out, one by one.
It seems unrealistic to assume, that the players will stick to a strate-
gy, which has become suboptimal. (Unless they have to work on their cre-
dibility, but this puts the problem in the realm of threat strategies
and cooperation, which is not considered here.) So, there are arguments,
which justify the claim, that Bellman's principle of optimality should
hold in dynamic optimization models. A technical consequence, in case
it doesnot, is, that dynamic programming (D.P., recursive optimizations)
cannot be used to find a solution to the problem.
Brandsma and Hughes Hallett derive, that the solution to their problem
can be found by D.P. in case one takes account of the so called "time
consistency constraints". But these time consistency constraints contain
the values of some of the Lagrange multipliers, associated with the ori-
ginal overall problem. And these values can only be determined by solving
the original problem in Lagrange form. So, a decomposition of this kind
is not an alternative solution technique. At the most it is a check for
the solution, that one has already found. The time consistency constraints
are not directly based on the parameters of the model. As an illustration
I take one of the solutions for the example:- 8 -
x(1)~ - x(2)~`
- C- ? - 1~T - - 5 5
with Lagrange multipliers
u(1)'
- u(2)~` - C1 3~T. - - 5 5
The result of Brandsma and Hughes Hallett is, that
(1)~ (2)~ 1
xl - xl - - 5
can be found as the solution to the problem with cost functionals
(i) 1 2 (i)2 1 (i)
wl ,- 2(yl t xl ) t 5 xl , i- 1,2,
where yl is a constant. The last term in these cost functionals is a
time consistency constraint, where 5 is the value of the first Lagrange
multiplier of the original problem.
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In a one player deterministic linear quadratic framework the optimal control
laws for different information structures all lead to the same control values,
state trajectories and costs.
This is not true in a two player Nash game.
Basar ([1]) recognized, that adding memory to the information gives rise to
infinitely many Nash solutions.
This paper aims at selecting the undominated points of this set of linear Nash
solutions for a simple two stage game. To that end first a suitable characte-
rization of the set is desired. This characterization is based on strateqy
representations, which differ somewhat from the ones Basar ([2)) uses, but
which can be understood easier. I- 11 -
1. Introduction
It is well known, that the open loop and feedback optimal control laws in a
deterministic lineaz quadratic framework lead to the same control values,
state trajectories and costs.
Or, more generally, when history dependent information about the state of the
system is allowed, the optimal control can be represented as a mapping on the
information set in infinitely many ways. Two examples are the open loop and
feedback strategies.
Basar ([1]) recognized, that this phenomenon leads to infinitely many Nash
solutions in deterministic linear quadratic two player non-zero sum difference
games with a history dependent or closed loop memory information structure.
But some of these Nash solutions are dominated by others in the sense, that
both players have lower costs. The question rises: "can we characterize the
set of undominated Nash solutions?". This question is evaluated in the context
of a simple two stage game. The strateqy representation chosen differs some-
what fro~m Basar's ([2]) representation. This, of course, leads also to a dif-
ferent characterization of the set of linear Nash solutions. We will find,
that the open loop and feedback Nash solutions do not belong to the set of
undominated solutions.
2. Representation of the optimal control law
Consider the following optimal control problem:
minimize
J(xl,x2):- 2(y2 } yi t x2 } xl)
where
yi - yi-1 } xi' 1- 1'2
y . E ~t: states , i
x. E R: controls,
i
i : stages.
And consider thzee information structures:
1) "open loop": the decision maker has at both stages only access to the
initial state yp; the controls xi may only be a function of y~.- 12 -
2) "feedback": the decision maker has at stage i only access to the present
state yi-1; the controls xi may only be a function of
Yi-1~
3) "history dependent": the decision maker has at stage i access to all the
states up to state yi-1; the controls xi may be a function of all the
states up to state y.
i-1'
Substitution of the state equations into the cost functional immediately leads
to the open loop solution. Dynamic programming yields the feedback solution.
Open loop solution:
xl -- 5 YO' x2 -- 5 YO'
Feedback solution :
xl -- 5 YO' x2 -- 2 Y1'




' - 5 y0' - .5 YO'




when history dependent information is allowed, all the control laws of the form
~
xz - ayl t bY0
{ ,~ 3 ,
xl - - 5 YO
where 5 a t b-- 5, a,b E~2,
also have this optimal performance. The open loop and feedback strategies are
special cases for a - 0 and b- 0, respectively.
So, in case of a history dependent information structure there are infinitely
many representations of the optimal control law. But for all these representa-
tions the optimal actions and resulting costs are the same. In that sense the
optimum is unique. This is not true, however, for the Nash equilibrium concept
in a two player difference game, as can be seen in the next section.- 13 -
3. Aistory dependent Nash solutions
Consider the following difference game:
player 1: minimize J(x,k):- 2(2y2 f 2yi t x2 t xi)
x
player 2: minimize J(x,k):- 2(y2 { yi } k2 } ki)
where
k
y. - Y. t x t k., i- 1,2 i i-1 i i
x:- (xl,x2), k:- (kl,x2),
y. E R: states,
i
xi E R: controls player 1,
ki E R: controls player 2,
: stages
And consider the Nash solution concept:
J(x~,k~) ~ J(x,k~), Vx E R2, (a)
(X~,7C~) M
Nash solution J(x~,k~) ~ J(x~,k), Vk E R2. (b)
In fact one has to solve two optimal control problems (a) and (b) for player 1
and player 2, respectively, parametrized by the strategy of the other player.
So, in case they exist, the resulting optimal control laws are functions of
that other strategy. One ends up with a set of equations. Each solution to
that set of equations is a Nash solution.
By (a) and (b) a global equilibrium is defined. When dynamic programminq is
applied, actually a staqewise (feedback) Nash equilibrium is found. However,
as we will also see later, in this deterministic linear quadratic framework
the global solution coincides with the stagewise solution.
The open loop and feedback Nash equilibria are unique, but lead to different
control values, state trajectories and costs.- 14 -
Open loop solution:
' 10 ' S
xl -- 19 y0 xl -- 19 y0
rt 2 x 1
x2 -- 19 y0 x2 -- 19 y0
state trajectory: y
4 y 1 y
0' 19 0' 19 0'
costs:
138 2 43 2
722 y0' 722 y0'
Feedback solution :
xl -- 36 y0 xl -- 4 y0
~ 1 w 1
x2 -- 2 yl z2 -- 4 yl
2 1
state trajectory:
YO' 9 y0' 18 y0'
513 2 153 2
costs:
2592 y0' 2592 y0'
The open loop solution is somewhat better for player 1 and the feedback solution
for player 2.
Let us see in more detail what happens, when general history dependent informa-
tion is allowed. Suppose we have linear control laws of the following form:
x2 - ayl }~0 x2 - dyl } ey0 { , { , a,b,c,d,e,f ~ ~2
xl - cy0 Scl - fy0
The linear strategies of the players are represented by the tuples (a,b,c) and
(d,e,f), respectively.
Given (d,e,f), player 1 faces the optimal control problem:
minimize J(xl,x2):- 2(2y2
} 2yi } x2 } xi)
where y2 -(ltd)yl t ey0 t x2,
yl - (ltf)y0 t xl.- 15 -
.
Optimal control values: xz - -2qy~
~
xl - (-2(ltd)q - 2p)y0
(lff) - 3 (ltd)e 3 (ltd)(itf) f e
where p:- 2 2 and q:- 2 2
(3 (ltd) t 3) (3 (ltd) t 3)
State trajectory:
y0' py0' ~0'
So, (a,b,c) has to fulfil:
ap t b - -2q
{
c - -2(ltd)q - 2p
Observe, e,q, from the state equations:
3q - (ltd)p t e
{
p- 1} c t f
Analogously, given (a,b,c), player 2 faces the opti.mal control problem:
minimize
J(z1,x2):- 2(yz } yl } X2 }~1)
where y2 - (lta)yl } by~ t k2,










2(ltc) - (lta)b (lta)(ltc) f 2b
where p: - 2 and fl: - 2
(lta) t 4 (lta) t 4- 16 -
State trajectory: y0' py0' ~0'
So, (d,e,f) has to fulfil:
dp t e - -q
{
f - -(lta)q - p
Observe, e.g. from the state equations:
z4 - (ita)p t b
{
p- 1 t c t f
From (4) and (8) and then from (1), (7), (5) and (3), or from the state
trajectories, it follows:
p- P and q- fi





These calculations finally imply, that Nash solutions for this type of strate-
gies are given by six tuples (a,b,c,d,e,f), which fit the following set of
equations:
4q - 1 t c t f
qa - -5g - f
2qd - -lOq - c
b - 18q } 4f
e - 19q t 2c
(9)
For all (c,f) E~22, such that 1 t c t f~ 0, the set of equations (9) yields a
Nash solution. Zn case 1 t c t f- 0(9) is inconsistent. This situation would
imply that yi - 0. Nash solutionswith yi - 0 result only in the limit for a-~ m
and d y m.
1 19 2 2 2 1 9 2 2 2
Costs: 2(8(ltctf) t c)y0 and Z(8 (ltctf) t f)y0.- 17 -
Remark:
For a- d- 0 the open loop solution is found again, as can be expected. For
b- e- 0 the global feedback solution is found; it coincides with the stage-
wise feedback solution, derived earlier by means of dynamic programming.
4. Unàominated solutions
In section 3 infinitely many Nash equilibria were found for linear strategies
with history dependent information. Within this set some points are dominated
by other points in the sense that at least one of the players. has lower costs,
while the other is not worse off. The set of undominated solutions can be
characterized nicely in the following way (see e.g. Plasmans and de Zeeuw ([3])):
minimize aJ(c,f) t(1-a)J(c,f), a E[0,1],
where J(c,f):- 2(lá (1}ctf)2 f c2)y~,
J(c,f):- 2 (á (ltcff)~ t f2)y~.
Result: [f] - ~Oa t 9 [l~a] ~ E [0,1]
8a - 18a - 9
(10)
The extreme cases a- 0 and a- 1 have to be excluded, because they both lead to
1 t c t f- 0, where we do not have Nash solutions ( see section 3).
As an example consider the case a- 1
3 '
From (10): c - -
From (9):
74 37
127 ' f - - 127 '
Nash solution:
xl -- 127 y0 xl -- 127 y0
~ 17 76 ~ ~ 17 72
x2 - 4 yl - 127 y0 x2 - 4 yl - 127 y0- 18 -
State trajectory: y 16 y 4 y
0' 127 0' 127 0
3042 2 1657 2
Costs:
16129 y0' 32258 y0'
This solution dominates the open loop solution as well as the feedback solution.
5. Eyaluation
Nash solutions for a game are attractive, because they are stable in the sense
that none of the players has an incentive to deviate.
Undominated Nash solutions are attractive, because they guarantee that there is
not another Nash solution, such that both players have lower costs.
We have considered a simple two player two stage deterministic linear quadratic
game. The feedback Nash solution is unique. Adding some memory to the informa-
tion structure leads to infinitely many linear Nash equilibria. We have derived
a clear characterization of the set of undominated solutions. The feedback so-
lution does not belong to this set.
However, we could argue, that it is hard to believe, that the players would act
suboptimally at the last stage of the game in case the state yl appears to have
some unexpected value. So we could claim, that the strategies should be in
equilibrium at that stage for all states yl, which can be reached. In fact we
postulate Bellman's principle of optimality. Or, we apply Selten's ([4]) per-
fectness concept. When these dynamic arguments are added, only the feedback
Nash solution results. The same is true, when white noise is added to the sys-
tem equations, as Basar ([1], [2]) has shown.
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